Abeler, J. (with Nosenzo, D. and Raymond, C.), Preferences for Truth-Telling. Conditionally accepted at Econometrica.

Efferson, C. and Vogt, S., Behavioural homogenisation with spillovers in a normative domain. Proceedings of the Royal Society B.

Efferson, C., Economic Psychology. International Encyclopedia of Anthropology.

Huffman, D. (with Asch, D., Kullgren, J., Loewenstein, G., Sen, A., and Volpp, K.), Do Financial Incentives Reduce Intrinsic Motivation for Weight Loss? Evidence from Two Tests of Crowding Out. Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Huffman, D. (with Mitchell, O. and Maurer, R.), Time Discounting and Economic Decision Making in the Older Population. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing.

McKay, R., Ross, R., O’Lone, K., and Efferson, C., The Error of God, Revisited. Religion, Brain, & Behavior.


Aksoy, O. and Billari, F. C., Political Islam, Marriage, and Fertility: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. American Journal of Sociology, 123 (5), 1296-1340.

Benjamin, D. J., Berger, J. O., Johannesson, M. et al (including Efferson, C.), Redefine Statistical Significance. Nature Human Behaviour, 2, 6–10.

Duch, R. M. (with Tedin, K. and Williams, L.), North American Public Opinion on Health and Smoking. Public Opinion Quarterly, nfx034.

Duch, R. M., Laroze, D. and Zakharov, A., Is Cheating a National Pastime? Experimental Evidence. (Working paper)

Duch, R. M., Laroze, D., Reinprecht, C. and Robinson, T. S., Where will the British Go? And Why? (Working paper)

Gill, D. (with Kissova, Z., Lee, J., and Prowse, V.), First-Place Loving and Last-Place Loathing: How Rank in the Distribution of Performance Affects Effort Provision. Management Science.

Plümper, T., Laroze, D., and Neumayer, E. Regional inequalities in premature mortality in Great Britain. PLoS ONE 13(2): e0193488.


Abeler, J. (with Marklein Felix), Fungibility, Labels, and Consumption. Journal of the European Economic Association, 15(1), 99–127.

Aksoy, O., Motherhood, Sex of the Offspring, and Religious Signalling. Sociological Science, 4, 511-527.

Crawford, I., Nonparametric Analysis of Time-Inconsistent Preferences. (Working paper)

Gill, D. (with Prowse, V.), Strategic complexity and the value of thinking. (Working paper)

Huffman, D. (with Bognanno, M.), High-Powered Performance Pay and the Crowding out of Worker Non-Monetary Motivations. Management Science.

Huffman, D. (with Dolmen, T., Falk, A., Golsteyn, B., and Uwe, S.), Risk Attitudes Across the Life Course. The Economic Journal, 127(605), 95-116.

Panin, A. (with Abdellaoui M., Kemel, E., Vieider, F.), Take Your Risk or Take Your Time. (Working paper)

Panin, A. (with Abdellaoui, M., Kemel, E., Vieider, F.), A Method for the Integrated Measurement of Risk and Time Preferences. (Working paper)

Panin, A. (with Auriol E., Lassebie, J., Raiber, E., Seabright, P.), God Insures Those Who Pay: Formal Insurance and Religious Offering in Ghana. (Working paper)

Simpson, B. and Aksoy, O., Cumulative Advantage in Collective Action Groups: How Competition for Group Members Alters the Provision of Public Goods. Social Science Research, 66, 1-21.

Vogt, S., Efferson, C., and Fehr, E., The Risk of Female Genital Cutting in Europe: Comparing Immigrant Attitudes toward Uncut Girls with Attitudes in a Practicing Country. Social Science & Medicine – Population Health, 3, 283-293.

Zimmermann, J. and Efferson, C., One-Shot Reciprocity under Error Management Is Unbiased and Fragile. Evolution and Human Behavior, 38, 39-47.


Aksoy, O. Regression Discontinuity Diagnostics Reveal Statistical Anomalies in Turkish Elections. Electoral Studies, 44, 284-292.

Aksoy, O. and Gambetta, D. Behind the Veil: The Strategic Use of Religious Garb. European Sociological Review, 32 (6), 792-806.

Crawford V. P. New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(4), 131–150.

Crawford, I. Extremists. An Experimental Study Of How Social Interactions Change Preferences. (Working paper)

Duch, R. M. (with Beramendi, P. and Matsou, A.) Comparing Modes and Samples in Experiments: When Lab Subjects Meet Real People. Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College. (Working paper)

Duch, R. M. (with Solaz, H.) Who is Cheating and Why? Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College. (Working paper)

Efferson, C. and Lalive, R., Cacault, M. P., and Kistler, D. The Evolution of Facultative Conformity Based on Similarity. PLoS ONE, 11(12), e0168551.

Efferson, C., Roca, C., Vogt, S., and Helbing, D. Sustained Cooperation by Running Away from Bad Behavior. Evolution and Human Behavior 37, 1-9.

Ehret, S. Online Synchronous Experiments: Methods, Application, Examples. (Working paper)

Ehret, S. Spoiling Gifts. Temptation and Citizen-Elite Interaction. Evidence from a Field in the Lab Experiment. (Working paper)

Ehret, S. The Extremist’s Dilemma: Projection Bias and Ideological Commitment. A Field experiment. (Working paper)

Gambetta, D. (with Bigoni, M., Bortolotti, S., Casari, M., and Pancotto, F.) Amoral Familism, Social Capital, or Trust? The Behavioural Foundations of the Italian North-South Divide. The Economic Journal, 126 (594), 1318–1341.

Gambetta, D. (with Ermisch, J.) Income and Trustworthiness. Sociological Science, 3, 710-729.

Gambetta, D. (with Hertog, S.) Engineers of Jihad. What Education Can Tell Us About Violent Extremists. Princeton University Press.

Gill, D. (with Prowse, V., Clark, D., Rush, M.) Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments. (Working paper)

Gill, D. (with Prowse. V.) Cognitive Ability, Character Skills, and Learning to Play Equilibrium: A Level-k Analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 126(4), 1619-1676.

Gill, D. (with Thanassoulis, J.) Competition in Posted Prices with Stochastic Discounts. Economic Journal, 126 (594), 1528-1570.

Huffman, D. (with Becker, A., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., and Sunde, U.) The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9674.

Vogt, S., Zaid, N. A. M., Ahmed, H. E. F., Fehr, E., and Efferson, C. Changing Cultural Attitudes on Female Genital Cutting. Nature, 538, 506-509.

Young, H. P. (with Arieli, I.), Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games. Econometrica, 84(2), 627-676.

Young, P. H. (with Nax, H. H. et al.) Learning in a Black Box. Oxford Economics Discussion Paper 653.


Abeler, J. (with Jäger, S.) Complex Tax Incentives. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(3), 1-28.

Abeler, J. (with Nosenzo, D.) Self-Selection into Laboratory Experiments: Pro-Social Motives vs. Monetary Incentives. Experimental Economics, 18(2), 195–214.

Aksoy, O. Effects of Heterogeneity and Homophily on Cooperation. Social Psychology Quarterly, 78(4), 324-344.

Aksoy, O. and Weesie, J. Testing Game-Theoretic Comparative Statics Using Bayesian Model Selection. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 39(4), 223-228.

Bozoyan, C. and Vogt, S. The Impact of Third-Party Information on Trust: Valence, Source, and Reliability. PLoS ONE, 11(2), e0149542.

Crawford V. P., Efficient Mechanisms for Level-k Bilateral Trading. (Working paper)

Crawford, I. (with Blundell, R., Browning, M., Cherchye, L., De Rock, B. and Vermeulen, F.) Sharp for SARP. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(1), 43–60.

Duch, R. M. (with Albert Falco-Gimeno) Coalition Voting and the Economic Agenda Setter. Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College. (Working paper)

Duch, R. M. (with Michele Belot and Luis Miller) Who Should be Called to the Lab? A Comprehensive Comparison of Students and Non-Students in Classic Experimental Games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 13, 26-33.

Duch, R. M., Przepiorka, W., and Stevenson, R. Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2), 372–389.

Efferson, C., Vogt, S., Elhadi, A., Ahmed, H.E.F., and Fehr, E. Female Genital Cutting Is Not A Social Coordination Norm. Science, 349, 1446-1447.

Ehret, S. Political Participation in a World of Gene-Environment Interaction. (Working paper)

Gill, D. (with Stone, R.) Desert and Inequity Aversion in Teams. Journal of Public Economics, 123, 42-54.

Huffman, D. (with Becker, A., Dohmen, T., Enke, B., Falk, A., Sunde, U.) The Nature and Predictive Power of Preferences: Global Evidence. (Working paper)

Huffman, D. (with Bronchetti, E. and Magenheim, E.) Attention, Intentions, and Follow-Through in Preventive Health Behavior: Experimental Evidence on Flu Vaccination. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 116, 270-291.

Huffman, D. (with Falk, A. and MacLeod, B.) Institutions and Contract Enforcement. Journal of Labor Economics, 33(3), 571-590.

Vogt, S., Efferson, C., Berger, J., and Fehr, E. Eye Spots Do Not Increase Altruism in Children. Evolution and Human Behavior, 36(3), 224-231.

Young, H. P. The Evolution of Social Norms. Annual Review of Economics, 7, 359-387.

Young, H. P. (with Allahrakha, M. and Glasserman, P.) Systemic Importance Indicators for 33 U.S. Bank Holding Companies: An Overview of Recent Data. Office of Financial Research, Brief 15-01.

Young, H. P. (with Glasserman, P.) How Likely Is Contagion in Financial Networks? Journal of Banking and Finance, 50, 383-399.


Abeler, J. (with Albrecht, K., Weber, M., Falk, A.) The Brain Correlates of the Effects of Monetary and Verbal Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation. Frontiers in Decision Neuroscience, 8, art. 303.

Abeler, J. (with Becker, A., Falk, A.) Representative Evidence on Lying Costs. Journal of Public Economics, 113, 96-104.

Aksoy, O. and Weesie, J. Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis of Outcome- and Process-Based Social Preferences and Beliefs in Dictator Games and Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemmas. Social Science Research, 45, 98-116.

Crawford, I. (with Polisson, M.) Testing for Intertemporal Separability. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 52(C), 46–49.

Crawford, V. Gray Eminence? Eminent Economists II-Their Life Philosophies. Szenberg, M. and Ramrattan, L. (eds.), Cambridge University Press.

Duch, R. M. (with Rueda, D.) Generosity among Friends: Population Homogeneity, Altruism and Insurance as Determinants of Redistribution? Working paper delivered at the Conference “Reason and Decision Making”, Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College.

Ehret, S. Countervailing Effects of Household Credit Finance on Partisan Moods. (Working paper)

Gambetta, D. (with Flashman, J.) Thick as Thieves: Homophily and Trust Among Deviants. Rationality and Society, 26(1), 3-45.

Gambetta, D. (with Przepiorka, W.) Natural and Strategic Generosity as a Signal of Trustworthiness. PLoS ONE 9(5), e97533.

Gambetta, D. (with Szekely, A.) Signs and (Counter) Signals of Trustworthiness. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 106, 281-297.

Gill, D. (with Prowse, V.) Gender Differences and Dynamics in Competition: The Role of Luck. Quantitative Economics, 5(2), 351-376.

Hruschka, D., Efferson, C., Jiang, T., Falletta-Cowden, A., Sigurdsson, S., McNamara, R., Sands, M., Munira, S., Slingerland, E., and Henrich, J. Impartial Institutions, Pathogen Stress, and the Expanding Social Network. Human Nature, 25, 567-579.

Huffman, D. (with Altmann, S., Falk, A., and Grunewald, A.) Contractual Incompleteness, Unemployment, and Labor Market Segmentation. Review of Economic Studies, 81(1), 30-56.

Kuwabara, K., Vogt, S., Watabe, M., and Komiya, A. Trust, Cohesion, and Cooperation after Early Versus Late Trust Violations in Two-Person Exchange: the Role of Generalized Trust in the U.S. and Japan. Social Psychology Quarterly, 77(4), 344-360.

Young, H. P. (with Gabriel E. Kreindler, G. E.) Rapid Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, Suppl. 3, 10881-10888.

Young, H. P. (with Marden, J. R. and Pao, Y. L.) Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 52, 2753-2770.

Young, H. P. (with Noe, T.) Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services. Morris, N. and Vines, D. (eds.), Oxford University Press.

Young, H. P. (with Wallace, C.) Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics. Young, H. P. and S. Zamir. S. (eds.), the Handbook of Game Theory, vol. IV, Elsevier.


Aksoy, O. and Weesie, J. Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis of Biased Beliefs and Distributional Other-Regarding Preferences. Games, 4(1), 66-88.

Aksoy, O. and Weesie, J. Social Motives and Expectations in One-Shot Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemmas. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 37(1), 24-58.

Belot, M., Crawford, V. P., and Heyes, C. Players of Matching Pennies Automatically Imitate Opponents’ Gestures Against Strong Incentives. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 110(8), 2763-2768.

Crawford, I. (with Pendakur, K.) How Many Types Are There? Economic Journal, 123(567), 77–95.

Crawford, V. P. Boundedly Rational versus Optimization-Based Models of Strategic Thinking and Learning in Games. Journal of Economic Literature, 51, 512-527.

Crawford, V. P., Costa-Gomes, M. A., and Iriberri, N. Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications. Journal of Economic Literature, 51, 5-62.

Duch, R. M. and Sagarzazu, I. Election Campaigns, Public Opinion and the Financial Crisis of 2008-2010 in the U.K. and Germany. In Bermeo, N. and Bartels, L. M., (eds.) “Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinion, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession”. Russell Sage Foundation and Oxford University Press.

Duch, R. M. and Stevenson, R. Voter Perceptions of Agenda Power and Attribution of Responsibility for Economic Performance. Electoral Studies, 32(3), 512-516.

Efferson, C. and Vogt, S. Viewing Men’s Faces Does Not Lead to Accurate Predictions of Trustworthiness. Scientific Reports, 3, 1-7.

Gambetta, D. (with Bigoni, M., Bortolotti, S., Casari, M.) It Takes Two to Cheat: an Experiment on Derived Trust. European Economic Review, 64, 129-146.

Gill, D. (with Prowse, V. and Vlassopoulos, M.) Cheating in the Workplace: An Experimental Study of the Impact of Bonuses and Productivity. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 96, 120-134.

Huffman, D. (Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Schupp, J., Sunde, U., Vischer, T., and Wagner, G.) Validating an Ultra-Short Survey Measure of Impatience. Economics Letters, 120, 142-145.

Huffman, D. (with Bronchetti, E. Dee, T. and Magenheim, E.) When a Nudge Isn’t Enough: A Field Test of the Power of Defaults to Influence Savings of Low-Income Tax Filers. National Tax Journal, 66(3), 609-634.

Shanto I. et al (including Duch, R. M.), Do Attitudes About Immigration Predict Willingness to Admit Individual Immigrants? A Cross-National Test of the Person-Positivity Bias. Public Opinion Quarterly, 77(3), 641-665.

Stevenson, R. and Duch, R. M. The Meaning and Use of Subjective Perceptions in Studies of Economic Voting. Electoral Studies, 32(2), 305-320.

Vogt, S., Efferson, C., and Fehr, E. Can We See Inside? Predicting Strategic Behavior Given Limited Information. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34, 258-264.

Young, P. H. (with Kreindler, G. E.) Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Equilibrium Selection. Games and Economic Behavior, 80, 39-67.

Young, P. H. (with Nax, H. H. and Pradelski, B. S. R.) Decentralized Dynamics to Optimal and Stable States in the Assignment Game. Proceedings of the 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.


Aksoy, O. and Weesie, J. “Altruïsme en Ongelijkheidsaversie in Intra- en Intergroupinteracties” in Buskens, V. and Maas, I. (eds.) “Onderzoek Naar Sociale Dilemma’s in Nederland”. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Aksoy, O. and Weesie, J. Beliefs about the Social Orientations of Others: A Parametric Test of the Triangle, False Consensus, and Cone Hypotheses. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1), 45-54.

Duch, R. M. (with Sagarzazu, I.) Private versus Public Other-regarding Preferences and Redistribution. Paper delivered at the 2012 Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Duch, R. M. (with Tyran, R.) Coalition Context, Voter Heuristics and the Coalition-directed Vote. Centre for Experimental Social Science, Nuffield College. (Working paper).

Efferson, C. A review of “A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution” by Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. The Economic Journal, 122, F253-F269.

Gambetta, D. (with Origgi, G.) The L-Worlds. The Curious Preference for Low Quality and Its Norms. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 12(1), 3-23.

Gill, D. (with Prowse, V.) A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition. American Economic Review, 102(1), 469-503.

Gill, D. (with Sgroi, D.) The Optimal Choice of Pre-Launch Reviewer. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(3), 1247-1260.

Huffman, D. (with Dohmen, T., Falk, A., and Sunde, U.) Interpreting Time Horizon Effects in Inter-Temporal Choice. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6385.

Huffman, D. (with Dohmen, T., Falk, A., and Sunde, U.) The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes. Review of Economic Studies, 79(2), 645–677.

Huffman, D. (with Goette, L. and Meier, S.) The Impact of Social Ties on Group Interactions: Evidence from Minimal Groups and Randomly Assigned Real Groups. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4(1), 101–115.

Huffman, D. (with Goette, L., Meier, S. and Sutter, M.) Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations. Management Science, 58(5), 948–960.

Young, P. H. (with Bary, S. and Pradelski, R.) Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems. Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 882-897.

Young, P. H. (with Foster, D. P.) A Strategy-Proof Test of Portfolio Returns. Quantitative Finance, 12, 671-683.


Abeler, J. (with Falk, A., Goette, L., and Huffman, D.) Reference Points and Effort Provision. American Economic Review, 101(2), 470–492.

Crawford, I. (with Beatty, T.) How Demanding Is the Revealed Preference Approach to Demand. American Economic Review, 101, 2782–2795.

Crawford, V. P. and Meng, J. New York City Cabdrivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income. American Economic Review, 101, 1912-1932.

Duch, R. and Kellstedt, P. The Heterogeneity of Consumer Sentiment in an Increasingly Homogeneous Global Economy. Electoral Studies, 30(3), 399-405.

Duch, R. and Stevenson, R. Context and Economic Expectations: When Do Voters get it Right? British Journal of Political Science, 41, 1-31.

Huffman, D. Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants and Behavioral Consequences. The Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(3), 522–550.

McKay, R., Efferson, C., Whitehouse, H., and Fehr, E. Wrath of God: Religious Primes and Punishment. Proceedings of the Royal Society B. 278, 1858-1863.

Paciotti, B., Richerson, P. J., Lubell, M., Waring, T., McElreath, R., Efferson, C., and Edsten, E. Are Religious Individuals More Generous, Trusting, and Cooperative? An Experimental Test of the Effect of Religion on Prosociality. Research in Economic Anthropology, 31, 267-305.

Vogt, S., Buskens, V., Raub, W., and Weesie, J. Zur Dynamik Prosoziales Verhalten und Reziprozitaet in Einem Asymmetrischen Sozialen Dilemma: ein Beitrag zur Experimentellen Spieltheorie. Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie, 40(5), 338-355.

Young, P. H. The Dynamics of Social Innovation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(4), 21285-21291.

Young, P. H. (with Burke, M. A.) Social Norms. In “Handbook of Social Economics” by Bisin, A., Benhabib, J., Jackson, M. (eds.), vol. 1A, Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Young, P. H. (with Foster, D. P. and Stine, R.) A Markov Test for Alpha. Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 11-49.


Abeler, J. (with Altmann, S., Kube, S. and Wibral, M.) Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness Concerns: When Equality Is Unfair. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(6), 1299–1324.

Abeler, J. (with Calaki, J., Andree, K., and Basek, C.) The Power of Apology. Economics Letters.

Armstrong, D. and Duch, R. M. Why Can Voters Anticipate Post-election Coalition Formation Likelihoods. Electoral Studies, 29(3), 308-315.

Crawford, I. Habits Revealed. Review of Economic Studies, 77(4), 1382-1402.

Duch, R. M. and Stevenson, R. The Global Economy, Competency and the Economic Vote. Journal of Politics, 72(1), 105-123.

Duch, R. M., May, J., and Armstrong, D. Coalition-Directed Voting in Multi-Party Democracies. American Political Science Review, 104(4), 698-719.

Gambetta, D. (with Ermisch, J.) Do Strong Family Ties Inhibit Trust? Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 75(3), 365-376.

Gill, D. (with Stone, R.) Fairness and Desert in Tournaments. Games and Economic Behavior, 69(2), 346-364.

Huffman, D. (with Bonin, H., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Jaeger, D., and Sunde, U.) Direct Evidence on Risk Attitudes and Migration. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(3), 684 – 689.

Huffman, D. (with Dohmen, T., Falk, A., and Sunde, U.) Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability? The American Economic Review, 100(3), 1238 – 1260.

McKay, R. and Efferson, C. The subtleties of error management. Evolution and Human Behavior, 31, 309-319.

Vogt, S. Review of “The rewards of punishment. A relational theory of norm enforcement” by Horne, C. Rationality, Markets, and Morals, 1, 5-8.

Young, P. H. (with Foster, D. P.) Gaming Performance Fees by Portfolio Managers. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 1435-1458.